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IN THE SUPREl'~1E COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Utah, and 
J. BRACKEN LEE, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants~ 
vs. 
THE ~IETROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT o~~ SALT LAKE 
CITY, a corporation, and SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9617 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs brought this action to determine the 
validity of taxes levied by defendant The Metropolitan 
'Vater District of Salt Lake City for the year 1961, 
and to secure a declaratory judgment relating to the 
taxing power of said defendant under the statutes of 
this state. Plaintiff .J. Bracken Lee also seeks recovery 
of taxes paid under protest. 
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DISPOSITION BEFORE LOWER COURT 
On November 24, 1961, the court, upon the stipu-
lation of the parties hereto, heard the case upon its 
merits in connection with plaintiff's Order To Show 
Cause why defendant The Metropolitan Water District 
of Salt Lake City should not be restrained from dis-
posing of the unappropriated cash surplus then in the 
hands of said defendant. The lower court granted judg-
ment for the defendants and held ( 1) the tax assessed 
and levied by the defendant Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict of Salt Lake City on August 7, 1961, was valid, 
(2) that the plaintiffs are not entitled to have any part 
of the money paid by Salt I_.iake City to said defendant 
for water sold and delivered to the City credited upon 
or deducted from the taxes levied by said Metropolitan 
Water District, and ( 3) that the defendant Metro-
politan Water l)istrict may levy taxes in one year for 
the purpose of carrying on the operations of the Dis-
trict during subsequent years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs-appellants seek the reversal of the 
trial court's holdings as above enumerated and judg-
ment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. 
STATEl\iENT OF F.ACTS 
The plaintiff Salt Lake City is, and was, a city 
of the first class in the State of Utah at all times rna-
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terial to this lawsuit. The plaintiff J. Bracken Lee is, 
and was, a resident taxpayer of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
at all times rnaterial hereto and paid, under protest, 
property taxes for 1961 levied against his residence at 
2031 Laird i-\venue which included an amount of $10.99 
levied by the 1\letropolitan Water District. (Exhibit 
#4.) The defendant Metropolitan Water District of 
Salt Lake City is, and at all times material herein was, 
a corporation organized and existing under and by 
virtue of the laws of the State of Utah, having its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County. The 
defendant Salt Lake County is a political subdivision 
of the State of Utah and was charged with the respon-
sibility of collecting taxes for the benefit of the Metro-
politan Water District in 1961. 
On the 7th day of August, 1961, the defendant 
~Ietropolitan Water District adopted a resolution 
levying taxes upon all taxable property within its cor-
porate liinits which are conterminous with, and consist 
of, the entire area of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, 
at the rate of twenty-five cents on each $100.00 of 
assessed valuation, which would result in revenue of 
approximately $639,690.00 to the District. (Exhibit 
#I, p. 7.) At the time this tax was levied, the Metro~ 
politan Water District had an unexpended, unappro~ 
priated cash surplus in excess of two million dollars. 
(Paragraph 8 of the Answer, R. 2, Paragraph 5 of 
Defendants' Findings of Fact, R. 83, and Statement 
of Income and Retained Revenues for Years Ended 
December 31, 1960 and 1959, as set forth on page 4 
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of Exhibit 3.) The Statement of Income and Retained 
Revenues of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake City (Exhibit 3, page 4) reveals that its total 
income from operations for the year ended December 
31, 1959, amounted to $873,853.07, and that its total 
operating expenses for the same period amounted to 
only $289,508.68, leaving a net income from operations 
of $584~344.39 to •which were added tax revenues of 
$611~928.21 and interest income of $45~942.59 resulting 
in a NET INCOME FOR THE YE.AR of $1~242~-
197.19. In the year ended December 31, 1960, the Dis-
trict's statement shows total income from operations 
to be $1,025,344.61 and total operating expenses of 
$571,361.17, leaving a net income from operations of 
$453~983.44 which~ when supplemented by tax revenue 
of $625~523.20 and interest income of $66~039.65 and 
reduced by an amo·unt of $33~096.08 for loss on aban-
donment of fixed assets~ res~ilted in a NET INCOME 
FOR THE YEAR of $1~112A51..21. The correctness 
of the foregoing statement was confirmed by the tes-
timony of Hampton C. Godbe, Assistant Manager and 
Treasurer of The .1\rietropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake City. (R. 53-57). Mr. Godbe also testified that 
said statement had been adopted by the Metropolitan 
Water District as its statement. (R. 56). Although 
Mr. Godbe resorted to vague and devious observations 
that a tax levy was necessary and essential for the 
operation, maintenance and administration of the Dis-
trict (R. 44, 58, 71-72) he finally admitted that the 
District's income fron1 operations exceeded its operat-
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ing expenses in 1959 and 1960 and that its entire tax 
revenues created a surplus fund for those years. (R. 
7'3, 76). He also testified that the District's total income 
has been increasing constantly. (R. 67). It should also 
be noted that the sales of water by the District to Salt 
Lake City for the years 1959 and 1960 amounted to 
$497,769.00 and $819,123.00 respectively, and for that 
portion of 1961 up until October 16, such sales amounted 
to $608,525.00. (Paragraph 13 of the Complaint as 
admitted by Paragraph 13 of the answer, R. 3, 17.) 
It is thus apparent that the sales of water by the Dis-
trict to Salt Lake City in 1959 and 1960 far exceed the 
District's total operating expenses of $289,508.68 for 
1959 and $571,361.17 for 1960 as shown on the State-
Inent of Income and Retained Revenues of the Metro-
politan Water District at page 4 of Exhibit 3. It neces-
sarily follows therefrom that the testimony of Mr. 
Godbe that the sale price of water to Salt Lake City 
is less than the District's cost of such water (R. 47) and 
that portion of defendants' Finding of Fact No. 5 (R. 
83) to the effect that the surplus funds of the District 
are "derived*** from the sale of water to others than 
Salt Lake City" are without basis in fact. As a matter 
of fact the sales of water by the District to others than 
Salt Lake City in 1959 amounted to only $362,777.80 
and in 1960 amounted to only $131,691.70 (by sub-
tracting sales to Salt Lake City from total water sales 
for such years as shown on the Statement of Income and 
Retained Revenue of the Metropolitan Water District 
at page 4 of Exhibit 3) . And yet the District showed a 
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Net Income from Operations of $584,344.39 for 1959 
and $453,983.44 in 1960. It therefore becomes undis-
puted that both the net income from operations and the 
cash surplus of the District consist chiefly of revenues 
derived from the sale of water by the District to Salt 
Lake City. And Mr. Godbe also testified that the water 
sold to Salt Lake City by the District is a commodity 
that is sold and delivered by it and when the sale is 
consummated, the City is at liberty to do with the 
water as it sees fit. (R. 27). 
The Metropolitan Water District admits that it 
has not credited the payments made by Salt Lake City 
for water against taxes levied by the District (Para-
graph 14 of the Complaint, R. 3, as admitted in Para-
graph 14 of the Answer at R. 17; Finding of Fact No. 
7, R. 84) and the Lower Court held, as a matter of law, 
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to have such pay-
ments so credited. (Paragraph 5 of defendants' Conclu-
sions of Law, R. 85, and Paragraph 2 of the Decree, 
R. 88.) 
Unlike all other municipal corporations or tax 
supported institutions, the Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict of Salt Lake City levies taxes not for expenditure 
in the year for which they 'vere levied but for expen-
diture in subsequent years. Thus Mr. Godbe testified 
that taxes levied in 1960 were actually used for operat-
ing expenses in 1961 (R. 57-59) and that the District 
operated on reserve funds (~. 57) and does not issue 
tax anticipation notes for operating capital. (R. 60). 
He also testified that the District's income for 1961 had 
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con1e frmn tax revenue, sale of water and interest earn-
ings on investments ( ll. 59) and that such income was 
not segregated into separate funds but was deposited 
into one general fund. ( R. 44, 58, 71-73) . 
In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Godbe testified 
that the Metropolitan "\Vater District had many pro-
posed projects relating to the acquisition, storage and 
distribution of water resources which would cost many 
n1illions of dollars. (R. 35-41). However, Mr. Godbe 
testified that such proposals had not been submitted to 
the voters of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake City ( R. 60) and that the District does not plan 
or intend to submit such proposals to said voters for 
their affirmance or disaffirmance in the foreseeable 
future. ( R. 67-70) . It necessarily follows therefrmn 
that the defendant Metropolitan Water District of 
Salt Lake City fully intends to charge the residents and 
taxpayers of Salt I.Jake City such rates for water sup-
plied to Salt Lake City as will, when augmented by 
t~v revenues levied solely for the purpose of enlarging 
existing cash surplu,ses ~ put the Board of Directors of 
said District in a position of absolute control in deter-
mining the cost and need of capital outlays of the Dis-
trict without seeking the approval of the District's tax-
paying voters as contemplated by the enabling statute 
relating to the District's incurring indebtedness in ex-
cess of its ordinary annual income and revenue. Mr. 
God be also testified that the Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict is under no contractual obligation to Salt Lake 
City to provide such facilities. (R. 63). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE 
PAYMENTS FOR WATER MADE BY SALT 
LAKE CITY TO THE METROPOLITAN W A-
TER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DE-
DUCTED FROM TAXES LEVIED BY THE 
DISTRICT BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 73-8-43, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
POINT II. 
'rHE METROPOLITAN WATER DIS-
TRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DOES NOT 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO LEVY TAXES FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF CREATING A CASH SUR-
PLUS. 
POINT III. 
THE METROPOLITAN WATER DIS-
TRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DOES NOT 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO LEVY TAXES IN 
ONE FISCAL YEAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
CARRYING ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
DISTRICT FOR SUBSEQUENT F I S CAL 
YEARS. 
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POINT IV. 
Tl-IE TAX LE,riED BY THE METRO-
POLIT.A.N \V .A.T}i~R DISTRICT OF SALT 
LAKE CITY IN 1961 WAS INVALID. 
POINT V. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANTS. 
POINT VI. 
THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE GRANT-
ED JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE PRAYER OF THE COMPLAINT. 
ARG-UMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLAN-TS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE 
PAYMENTS FOR WATER l\IIADE BY SALT 
LAKE CITY TO THE METROPOLITAN WA-
TER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DE-
DUCTED :FROM TAXES LEVIED BY THE 
DISTRICT BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 73-8-43, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The basic question involved is whether or not the 
City is entitled to have all payn1ents for purchases of 
water from the Metropolitan Water District applied 
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to the reduction of taxes which would otherwise be 
levied against the taxpayers of Salt Lake City under 
the statutes relating to the Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict. The purpose of this brief is to demonstrate that 
from the statutes involved no other construction can 
reasonably be given except that such credit shall be 
given for all payments made by cities to metropolitan 
water districts for the purchase and delivery of water. 
The crucial section in making such determination 
Is Section 73-8-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and 
especially the first four sentences thereof, which read_ 
as follows: 
"Sec. 73-8-43. Cities, the areas of which are 
included within metropolitan water districts in-
corporated hereunder, are hereby authorized to 
pay to such districts, out of funds from the sale 
of water or othed funds not appropriated to some 
other use, such amounts as may be determined 
upon by the govenning bodies, or other bodies, 
boards, comn1issioners or officers having control 
of such funds, thereof, respectively. Such pay-
ments may be made in avoidance of taxes as 
herein provided, or otherwise_, and shall not be 
deemed gratuitous or in the nature of gifts, but 
shall be deerned payments for water or services 
in connection with the distribution of water. Any 
city making any such payment to any district 
incorporated hereunder .. whether in avoidance of 
taxes or otherwise_, shall receive credit therefor 
and the amount of the payment so made by any 
city shall be deducted from the amount of taxes 
which would otherwise be levied against property 
lying therein as herein provided. In the event 
10 
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that payment so 1nade by any city shall exceed 
the mnount of taxes which would otherwise have 
been levied against property within such city, 
the mnount of such excess without interest shall 
be carried over and applied in reduction of taxes 
levied, or vvhich would otherwise have been levied 
during the ensuing year or years. * * *" (Em-
phasis added) . 
It will be noted that the above quoted section is 
clear and unequivocal, especially the third sentence 
wherein it is expressly provided that any city making 
payment to any district shall receive credit therefor and 
the amount of payment so made by any city shall be 
deducted from taxes. It would seem elemental that 
payn1ents for water by Salt Lake City to the Metro-
politan Water District should "be deemed payments 
for water" within the terminology of the above statute. 
And it would also appear beyond dispute that pay-
ments for water by Salt Lake City to the Metropolitan 
Water District would be from "funds not appropriated 
to some other use" by the city. 
It is the general rule of statutory construction that 
words of a statute will be interpreted in their ordinary 
acceptation and significance and the meaning com-
monly attributed to them. 50 A.m. Jur.~ Statutes~ Sec. 
238; Emmertson v. State Tax Commission~ 93 U. 219, 
72 P. 2d 467,113 A.L.R. 1174. And where the language 
of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a 
clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for 
resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and 
the court has no right to look for or impose another 
11 
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n1aening. 50 Am. Jur.~ Statutes~ Sec. 225; Sutherland~ 
Statutory Construction~ 3rd Edition_, Sec. 4502; Salt 
Lake Union Stock Yards v. State Tax Commission~ 93 
U. 166, 71 P. 2d 538. It is also uniformly held that a 
statute will be construed so as to give it effect and mean-
ing in preference to a construction which will render it 
ineffective and meaningless. 50 Am. Ju.r.~ Statutes_, Sec. 
357. In accordance with the above rules it is stated in 
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 225, at pages 206-207, with 
ample supporting authority as follows: 
"In the case of * * * unambiguity, it is the 
established policy of the courts to regard the 
statute as meaning what it says and to avoid 
giving it any other construction than that which 
its words demand. The plain and obvious mean-
ing of the language used is not only the safest 
guide to follow in construing it, but it has been 
presumed conclusively that the clear and ex-
plicit terms of a statute expresses the legislative 
intention, so that such plain and obvious provi-
sions must control. A plain and unambiguous 
statute is to be applied and not interpreted, 
since such a statute speaks for itself, and any 
attempt to make it clearer is a vain labor and 
tends only to obscurity. * * * " 
Thus, it is held that "any construction which contradicts 
the letter of a statute should be carefully scrutinized, 
and applied with caution and circumspection, lest the 
judgment of the court be substituted for that of the 
legislature." 50 Am. Jur.~ Statutes_, Sec. 241 and cases 
therein cited. As was stated in .Jay v. Boyd~ 351 U. S. 
345, 357, 100 L. Ed. 1242, 1254, 76 S. Ct. 919, 927 
(1956): 
12 
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"llut we Inust adopt the plain meaning of a 
statute, however severe the consequences." 
l t should also be noted that Section 73-8-43, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, is not limited, as claimed by 
th~ defendant, to payments made by the city in lieu of 
taxes under Section 73-8-38, but it states that payments 
Inade in that Inanner u or otherwisen shall be deemed 
payments for water or services in connection with the 
distribution of water. As stated above actual payments 
for water made by Salt Lake City to the District would 
certainly "be deemed payments for water" under the 
statute and thereby qualify as a payment "otherwise" 
than in lieu of taxes under Section 73-8-38. The above 
section taken in connection with other provisions of the 
.i\Ietropolitan vV ater District Act clearly evidences a 
legislative intent that water districts can tax only when 
they are unable to sell enough water to raise funds in 
a sufficient amount to cover what they would other-
wise receive in property taxes. In other words, prop-
erty taxes are to be levied only in the event water sales 
are less than the permissible levy of property taxes. 
Therefore, as an exa1nple, if the Metropolitan Water 
District of Salt Lake City is to levy taxes on the city's 
residents, its sales to the city must be less than the 2y2 
n1ill tax levy. In 1961 the 21;2 mill levy will net the 
)letropolitan Water District approximately $639,000. 
The city's payments to the Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict for 1960 and the first half of 1961 are over $650,-
000; consequently, the Board of Directors of the Metro-
politan 'Yater District should have allowed a credit 
13 
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to the residents of Salt Lake City, under Section 73-
8-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, prior to July 1, 
1961, and not levied any taxes upon the taxpayers of 
Salt Lake City for the calendar year 1961. This legis-
lative intent that metropolitan water districts are to 
be operated without benefit of taxation, insofar as pos-
sible, is evidenced in other sections of the Metropolitan 
Water District Act. Section 73-8-31 provides that the 
"Board of Directors shall fix such rates for water fur-
nished as will, in conjunction with the proceeds of the 
n1aintenance and operation tax authorized by Section 
73-8-18 (i) above, pay the operating expenses of the 
district, provide for repairs and depreciation of works 
owned or operated by such district, pay the interest on 
any bonded or other debt, and so far as practicable, 
provide a sinking or other fund for the payment of the 
principal of such debt as the same may become due; 
it being the intention of this section to require the dis-
tricts to pay the interest and principal of its indebted-
ness from the revenues of such district, so far as prac-
ticable." 
The provisions of the law relating to taxing powers 
are to be strictly construed, even in the case of water 
districts. At least the decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court, in the case of the Bou.ntif1tl Water Conservancy 
District v. Board of Commissioners of Bountiful, 5 
Utah 2d 142, 298 P. 2d 524, would seem to so indicate. 
In that case the Supreme Court held that ambiguous 
language relating to taxing authority would be resolved 
against the taxing authority and in favor of the tax-
14 
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payer, even where the public policy of water conserv-
ancy and sound water management is a factor in the 
law suit. 'I' his is in accordance with the general rule 
that tax laws are to be strictly construed against the 
state and in favor of the taxpayer and, therefore, where 
there is reasonable doubt as to the meaning of a revenue 
statute it should be resolved in favor of those taxed. 
Sutherland~ Statutory Construction~ 3rd Edition, Sec. 
6701. In this case we do not even have the problem of 
a "reasonable doubt" as to the meaning of the statute 
in question. Its provisions are clear and unambiguous 
and should be given effect in accordance with the fore-
going authority. 
It should also be noted that the construction of 
Section 73-8-43 as contended for by the plaintiffs would 
not affect the power of the District to levy taxes for 
the retirement of its general obligation revenue bonds 
under Section 73-8-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
which specifically requires that " ( t) he full faith and 
credit of the district shall be pledged to the payment 
of its general obligation and general obligation revenue 
bonds and taxes shall be levied * * * fully sufficient to 
pay such part of the principal of and interest on general 
obligation revenue bonds as the revenues of the district 
pledged thereto may not be sufficient to meet." Further-
more, taxes levied to pay principal of and interest on 
the bonds of the district are not subject to the limitation 
of twenty-five cents on each one hundred dollars of the 
assesed Yaluation of taxable property of the District 
under the provisions of Section 73-8-18 (i), Utah Code 
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Annotated, 1953. In connection with the above, it is 
interesting to note that Mr. Godbe testified that the 
District has never had to levy a special tax for the re-
tirement of the eight million dollar bond issue author-
ized by the taxpayers of the District in 1958 for the 
construction of the Little Cottonwood Water Treat-
ment Plant and that it was not expected that it would 
be necessary for the District to levy such a tax. (R. 
48). Thus, it is apparent that the District has been 
meeting its bonded indebtedness from the revenue of 
the District and that it has accumulated over a. two mil-
lion dollar surplus consisting in large part of the 2.5 
mill general tax levy being questioned in this appeal in 
spite of its bonded debt. 
POINT II. 
THE METROPOLITAN WATER DIS-
TRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DOES NOT 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO LEVY TAXES FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF CREATING A CASH SUR-
PLUS. 
Section 73-8-18 (i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
authorizes the Metropolitan Water Board to: 
"levy and collect taxes for the purposes of 
carrying on the operations, and paying the obli-
gations of the district; * * * provided, however, 
that taxes levied under this section for admin-
istering the district and operating its properties 
shall not exceed twenty-five cents on each one 
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hundred dollars of the assessed valuation of tax-
able property in the district. Taxes levied to pay 
principal of and interest on the bonds of the 
district, to pay indebtedness and interest there-
on owed to the United States of America, or 
to pay assessments or other amounts due any 
water users' association or other entity, public 
co-operative or private, from which the district 
procures water_, shall not be subject to the fore-
going limitation. * * * " (Emphasis added.) 
An examination of the above statutory grant of 
authority necessarily leads to the conclusion that no 
power to levy that particular tax for the purpose of 
creating a surplus for future operating expenses or 
future acquisition of water rights was intended or in-
cluded therein. Such a tax was intended solely "for ad-
ministering the district and operating its properties" 
-purely operational expenses for the taxing period 
involved. To hold otherwise would render ineffective the 
provisions of Section 73-8-22, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, which provides as follows: 
"Whenever the board of directors of any met-
ropolitan water district incorporated under this 
act shall, by ordinance * * * determine that the 
interests of said district and the public interest 
or necessity demand the acquisition, construction 
or completion of any source of water supply, 
water, waterworks or other improvement, works 
or facility, or the making of any contract with 
the United States or other persons or corpora-
tions, or the incurring of any preliminary ex-
pense, necessary or convenient to carry out the 
objects or purposes of said district wherein an 
indebtedness or obligation shall be created to sat-
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isfy which shall require a greater expenditure 
than the ordinary annual income and revenue 
of the district shall permit, said board of directors 
may order the submission of the proposition of 
incurring such obligation or bonded or other 
indebtedness for the purposes set forth in the 
said ordinance, to such qualified electors of such 
district as shall have paid a property tax in the 
year preceding such election, at an election held 
for that purpose. * * * " 
Section 73-8-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides that, if the above election favors such a proposi-
tion, "the district shall thereupon be authorized to incur 
such indebtedness or obligation." 
In light of Mr. Godbe's testiinony that the District 
contemplates a capital improvements program running 
into millions of dollars but does not anticipate any need 
to submit such proposed improvements to the electors 
of the District, it becomes apparent that the controlling 
body of the Metropolitan Water District intends to 
perpetuate such a surplus from the sale of its water and 
the imposition of the aforementioned general tax levy 
upon the taxpayers of Salt Lake City that it thereby 
acquires sole power to determine the needs of the Dis-
trict without permitting the people to voice their ap-
proval or disapproval of such projects. This is the type. 
of centralization of power in bureaucratic bodies which 
deprives the people of their basic freedoms and subjects 
them to taxation without representation. It becomes 
the more apparent when it is recognized that the gov-
erning body of the Metropolitan Water District is not 
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au~werable to its taxed subjects for its actions through 
the process of elections. 
It is clear that the authority vested in the ~Ietro­
politan \Vater Board under the above statutes is limited 
to levying taxes for administrative and operational 
expenses within stated limits and to pay bonded indebt-
edness and any amounts a due~~ for the purchase of 
water or water rights in addition thereto. Such tax 
levies are limited to the fiscal years involved under Sec-
tion 73-8-36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. In the event 
that expenditures in excess of current annual income are 
deemed necessary for the acquisition of water or facili-
ties, authority therefor must be obtained from the elec-
torate as provided. There is no authority in the statutes 
of this state which would allow the levy of taxes by the 
l\Ietropolitan Water Board in anticipation of expenses 
other than those conte1nplated for the particular fiscal 
year for which the taxes are levied. 
The authority contained in Section 73-8-18 ( m) , 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to "invest any surplus 
money" in certain securities cannot be interpreted to 
authorize the creation of surpluses by taxation contrary 
to the express provisions of the statute in relation there-
to. The above cited Section 73-8-18 (m) can relate only 
to such surpluses as may be lawfully created through 
the exercise of granted or implied powers, i.e., the sur-
plus realized from the sale of water at rates established 
by the District. 
The powers of water districts are limited to those 
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expressly granted by statute and also those necessarily 
or fairly implied, or incident to the powers expressly 
granted, or essential to the accomplishment of the de-
clared objects and purposes of the water district. Sec-
tion 73-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; Lehi City 
v. Meiling~ 87 U. 237, 48 P.2d 530; 94 C.J.S.~ Waters, 
sec. 243 ( 5) . And our Supreme Court has generally 
adhered to a policy of strictly limiting the extension of 
municipal powers by implication, particularly with re-
spect to the extensiOn of tax powers. Moss v. Board of 
Commissioners of Salt LJake City~ 1 U. 2d 60, 261 P.2d 
961. This is the general rule, applicable to "quasi-muni-
cipal'' corporations. S1dherland_, Statutory Construc-
tion_, 3rd Edition, Sec. 6501; 37 Am. Jur._, Municipal 
Corporations_, Sec. 6, p. 625, footnote 4. The court in 
the Moss case declared the rule in this state to be as 
follows, at page 964 of 261 P.2d: 
"The City's power to tax is derived solely 
from legislative enacbnent and it has only such 
authority as is expressly conferred or necessarily 
implied. This court has not favored the extension 
of the powers of the city by implication (citing 
cases) , and the only modification of such doc-
trine is where the power is one which is neces-
sarily implied (citing cases). Unless this re-
quirement is met_, the power cannot be deduced 
from any con.fiideration of convenience or neces-
sity_, or desirability of s11ch result_, and no doubt-
ful inference from other powers granted or from 
ambiguous or 11ncertain provisions of the law 
would be su;fficient ot sustain such authoritlf." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Certainly it cannot be said that the asserted right 
to levy taxes to establish a surplus for future expendi-
tures in excess of annual revenues can be implied from 
a statute in abrogation of specific provisions therein 
which expressly provide the means of acquiring funds 
for such expenditures. Express provisions of statutes 
prevail over any possible implied provisions which con-
tradict them. 82 C.J.S.~ Statutes, Sec. 347, page 720. 
POINT III. 
TI-IE lVIETROPOLITAN WATER DIS-
TRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DOES NOT 
HA YE THE RIGHT TO LEVY TAXES IN 
ONE FISCAL YEAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
CARR-YING ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
DISTRICT FOR SUBSEQUENT F I S CAL 
YEARS. 
Section 73-8-36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides as follows: 
"On or before the 20th day of August the 
board of directors of the district shall by resolu-
tion determine the amount of money necessary 
to be raised by taxation during the fiscal year 
beginning the 1st day of January next preceding 
and shall fix the rate of taxation of the areas of 
each separate city within the district, designating 
the number of cents upon each one hundred dol-
lars assessed valuation of taxable property in 
each of said areas in each county and shall levy 
a tax accordingly. 
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" (a) Sufficient to meet interest and sinking 
fund requirements on, and/or any payment to 
principal of, outstanding bonded and other in-
debtedness of said district; * * * or on any con-
tract or other indebtedness and 
"(b) For all other district purposes." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The above statute is clear and unambiguous. It per-
mits only the levy of taxes for money necessary to the 
conduct of the District's operations for the fiscal year 
beginning on the preceding January 1st~ not for the 
District's operations for any fiscal year subsequent to 
the date of fixing the tax rate. As has been pointed out 
under Point II, the power of the district to levy .a gen-
eral tax under Section 73-8-18 (i), Utah CodeAnno-
tated, 1953, is limited to purposes of "administering 
the district and maintaining and operating its prop-
erties." These, then, are the district purposes for which 
the District's Board of Directors "shall fix the rate of 
taxation" under Section 73-8-36 as above set forth. 
And such purposes must relate to the fiscal year com-
mencing on the preceding January I st. The levy of 
taxes in one fiscal year by a tax supported unit of gov-
ernment for undetern1ined and speculative use in the 
future is entirely foreign to our concept oof government 
as well as being in direct conflict with statutory pro-
visions as in this case. This is particularly egregious 
where the practice would permit the accumulation of 
large tax surpluses and thereby remove from the tax-
payers their statutory right to determine the extra-
ordinary capital needs of the District by vesting such 
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power solely in the hands of a non-elected board of 
directors. 
In view of the authorities cited under Point I with 
respect to the effect to be given plain, unambiguous 
language in a statute, it would appear clearly beyond 
dispute that the ~Ietropolitan V\T ater District of Salt 
Lake City may not levy a general tax in one fiscal year 
for expenditure by the District in the following or sub-
sequent fiscal years. The fact that this was done in 1961 
and previous years is undisputed. 
POINT IV. 
THE TAX LEVIED BY THE METRO-
POLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT 
LAKE CITY IN 1961 WAS INVALID. 
The plaintiffs incorporate herein the arguments 
set forth under POINTS I, II and III. 
POINT V. 
THE LOWER COURT ERR.ED IN GRANT-
ING JUDGMEN-T TO THE DEFENDANTS. 
The plaintiffs incorporate herein the arguments set 
forth under POINTS I, II and III. 
POINT VI. 
THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE GRANT-
ED JLTDG)l~~NT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE PRAYER OF THE COlVIPLAINT. 
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The plaintiffs incorporate herein the arguments set 
forth under POINTS I, II and III. 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the semantic smokescreen employed 
by the defendant Metropolitan Water Board to ob-
scure the real nature of its unappropriated cash surplus 
accumulated during 1959 and 1960 from profits realized 
from the sale of \Vater and taxes levied against the tax-
payers of Salt Lake City, it is clear that its so-called 
"emergency" or "reserve" fund in excess of two million 
dollars was simply a cash surplus created in large part 
by a "double tax" upon Salt Lake City's taxpayers. 
This is so because such taxpayers must pay for water 
consumed by them the same as the District's water 
consumers outside the city and yet, in addition thereto, 
are subjected to an ad valorem tax which swells a sur-
plus already realized by the District through its sale 
of water. Such a practice is contrary to the laws of the 
State of Utah and in particular the tax levied by the 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City in 1961 
was invalid for the following reasons: ( 1) Payments 
for water made by Salt Lake City were not credited 
against the tax levied by the District contrary to Section 
73-8-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; (2) Said tax 
was levied for the sole purpose of enlarging an existing 
cash surplus realized by the District from the sale of 
water thereby removing from the people, to the extent 
of the tax revenue collected, their right to determine the 
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need of capital expenditures made in excess of the Dis-
trict's ordinary income and revenue; and (3) It was 
not levied for district purposes for the fiscal year 1961 
contrary to Section 73-8-36, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
For the above reasons the judgment of the lower 
court should be reversed and plaintiffs should be granted 
judgment in accordance with the relief sought in the 
complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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